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Intraday Behavior of Stock Prices and
Trades around Insider Trading
A. Can Inci, Biao Lu, and H. Nejat Seyhun∗
Our evidence indicates that insiders’ trades provide significant new information to market partic-
ipants and they are incorporated more fully in stock prices as compared to noninsiders’ trades.
We find that market professionals do not front-run insiders’ trades. Both insiders’ purchases and
sales result in significant contemporaneous and subsequent price impact, while sales by large
shareholders result in a contemporaneous stock price decline that is subsequently reversed. The
arrival of insider purchases reverse the prevailing negative order imbalances from third party
trades and lead to piggy-backing by market professionals resulting in subsequent market purchase
orders as well as stock price increases.
How market participants react to the presence of informed traders has important implications
for the determination of security prices and bid-ask quotes. In some models of price formation,
security prices fully and immediately reveal the information possessed by informed traders
(Grossman, 1976), while in other models, security prices react gradually through subsequent
informed buying and selling activity (Bagehot, 1971; Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Glosten and
Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985; Glosten, 1989; Foster and Viswanathan, 1994). If the presence of
informed traders is not discovered directly, then market makers need to protect themselves from
informed traders by setting a sufficiently high bid-ask spread. Market participants also attempt to
infer the presence of informed traders indirectly from trade size, firm size, urgency of trade, time
of day, and price variability (Kraus and Stoll, 1972; French and Roll, 1986; Holthausen, Leftwich,
and Mayers, 1987, 1990; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; Barclay, Litzenberger, and Warner, 1990;
Hasbrouck, 1991a, 1991b; Barclay and Warner, 1993; Keim and Madhavan, 1996; Koski and
Michaely, 2000; Chakravarty, 2001).
In this paper, we document the intraday reaction of market professionals to the presence
of corporate insiders. Our evidence indicates large initial stock price adjustments on insiders,
followed by persistent piggy-backing of insiders’ trades and continued price reactions for the rest
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of the day.1 Both of these adjustments reduce market professionals’ losses to informed traders.
Our evidence further suggests that stock prices incorporate insiders’ information more quickly
and more fully relative to similar trades from noninsiders.
Using a large intraday transactions database, we identify insiders’ trades to the hour, minute, and
second by matching them against all intraday trades. Some previous studies have also examined
intraday stock price reaction to insider trading. Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003) document a
differential bid-ask spread adjustment among insider and noninsider trades between New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation
system (NASDAQ) stocks. Meulbroek (1992) analyzes stock price reaction in 320 illegal insider
trading cases. Similarly, using small samples of illegal insider trading cases, Cornell and Sirri
(1992), Chakravarty and McConnell (1997, 1999), and Fishe and Robe (2004) analyze the
relationship between illegal insider trading volume and stock prices, bid-ask spreads, and market
depth. There is also abundant literature regarding insider trading using daily or monthly returns.
Most insider trading studies find that insiders can predict 6- to 36-month future returns to their
firms’ stocks (Jaffe, 1974; Finnerty, 1976; Seyhun, 1986, 1998; Rozeff and Zaman, 1988; Lin and
Howe, 1990; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Garfinkel, Kahle, and Shastri, 2007). The only notable
exception is Eckbo and Smith (1998) who find that an aggregate insider portfolio of stocks listed
on the Oslo Stock Exchange did not outperform managed funds. Chung and Charoenwong (1998)
also examine the reaction of bid-ask spread to insider trading. On the aggregate level, Seyhun
(1988, 1998) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) determine that aggregate insider trading activity
can also predict future stock market movements. Clearly, insiders have information advantages
at both the firm level and the market level. Other authors focus on trader identity and have
studied the price impact of specialists, SuperDOT traders, and institutional traders (Hasbrouck
and Sofianos, 1993; Chan and Lakonishok, 1993, 1995; Harris and Hasbrouck, 1996).
Our insider trading database contains over 177,000 observations. On a trade-by-trade basis, we
find that the arrival of an insider purchase causes a large and significant initial price impact. Stock
prices continue to rise after insider purchases, resulting in a significant subsequent price impact as
well. The arrival of insider purchases also changes the order imbalance. Prior to insider purchases,
prices have been decreasing throughout the day and trades are characterized by market sell orders.
Following insider purchases, prices rise for the rest of the day and trades are characterized by
market buy orders. The intensity of trading activity also increases following the arrival of insider
purchases. Insider purchases are found to be executed almost at the bottom price over a 61-
day window and right at the moment when the previous downward price trend is reversed. The
significance of the detected initial and subsequent price impacts remains intact after we control
for trade size, bid-ask bounce, firm size, and the prior price trend using a matched noninsider
trade sample. We further examine the effects of bid-ask bounce by using returns based on quoted
ask prices instead of transaction prices (see Section II.G.1). The detected price impacts again
remain intact (our use of the quoted bid and ask quotes follows that in Koski and Michaely, 2000).
The significant price impacts and the reversals of price trend and order imbalances suggest that
market professionals (brokers and market makers) take into account the presence of registered
1The episode involving Martha Stewart’s December 27, 2001 sales of ImClone Systems stock provides a well-publicized
example of piggy-back trading. After ImClone founder and CEO, Dr. Sam Waksal, was tipped about an impending
rejection of the Erbitux application, he tipped his daughter to sell her stock and tried to sell 79,000 of his own shares
(worth about $5 million) as well. Peter Bacanovic, broker for both Dr. Waksal and Ms. Stewart at Merrill Lynch, alerted
Ms. Stewart about the attempted sale by Dr. Waksal. Martha Stewart then sold 3,928 shares of ImClone stock for a total
of $228,000. Thus, even an unsuccessful sale attempt by the CEO brought about piggy-back sales by Martha Stewart.
In this case, Mr. Bacanovic violated Merrill Lynch’s confidentiality policy by disclosing Dr. Waksal’s and his daughter’s
actions to Ms. Stewart. Both Ms. Stewart and Mr. Bacanovic were convicted of four counts of perjury and obstruction of
justice on March 5, 2004. However, Ms. Stewart was not charged with insider trading for selling ImClone stock.
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corporate insiders at the time of insider purchases. One possible source of this information is the
account registration statements where the insiders disclose their special relationship to their firm.
Our evidence also suggests that market professionals use their knowledge about insider purchases
to execute additional purchases either for themselves or for their favored clients.
The price impact of insider purchases has interesting correlations to various trade attributes that
have been candidates for proxies of informed trading. First, consistent with Easley and O’Hara
(1987), the full-day price impact is positive and uniform in trade size. Insiders do trade larger
volumes when they have more precise information. Second, the firm size variable is important.
Insider purchases in smaller firms have larger initial and subsequent price impacts than those in
larger firms. Third, price impact of insider trading is also greater to the extent that it provides a
surprise element in contradiction to other market trends. An insider purchase has a greater price
impact in a seller-dominated environment than in a buyer-dominated environment. It appears
that market professionals look to insider trading for potential reversals of long-term price trends.
Fourth, a sizable portion of insider purchases are executed through limit orders, which, by our
definition, are insider purchases with prices less than the average of the prevailing bid and ask
prices. We find that insiders also make much greater profits from limit orders than they do
from market orders. Our evidence cautions against characterizing market orders as information
motivated trades and limit orders as liquidity motivated trades. Finally, when comparing the price
reactions of insiders’ and matching noninsiders’ trades, we find that quote revisions in reaction
to insider trades are larger and longer lasting.
We observe that insider sales also cause a significant and negative contemporaneous price
impact regardless of trade size. Furthermore, the price impact for top executives’ and officers’
sales is not reversed during the remainder of the day. However, for large shareholders, the selling
pressure is quickly reversed during the following trades. The overall sales sample is dominated
by large shareholders reducing the information content of insiders’ sales. The asymmetry in the
full-day effects of insider purchases and sales does not appear to be caused by different trading
behavior of insiders. Insiders still act contrarian as the prices have been increasing throughout the
day prior to insider sales. This finding is again different from the findings regarding institutional
traders, who tend to sell after prices have been declining. It is more plausible that other market
participants regard insider sales as less telling and less informed than insider purchases. Since
corporate insiders are often endowed with large numbers of shares of stock and stock options,
their sales are more likely to be driven by liquidity or portfolio rebalancing needs and their
purchases are more likely to be information motivated.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we describe the construction of
our sample of insider trades. We also provide a preliminary analysis of these trades. In Section
II, we analyze the intraday behavior of stock prices around insider purchases and sales. We also
analyze the relationship between price impacts of insider trades and various potential proxies for
informed trading including order imbalance measures, speed of information incorporation, and
price discovery analyses. In Section III, we proffer our conclusions. A discussion of our matching
procedures and potential biases arising from matching are found in the Appendix.
I. Data Construction and Characteristics of Insider Trades
A. The Data
According to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, the term “corporate insiders” refers to
corporate officers, directors, and large shareholders who own more than 10% of the firm’s stock.
If insiders buy or sell their firm’s stock, they are mandated to file with the Securities and Exchange
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Commission (SEC) within the first 10 days of the next month following their transactions.2 The
SEC filing of each insider transaction includes information regarding the date, price, size, identity
of the insider, the insider’s relationship to the firm, and whether it is a purchase or sale. The SEC
data are also the original source for several commercial vendors, such as CDA/Investnet, that
provide data and analysis on insider trading.
To study the market microstructure effects of insider trading, however, one needs intraday
information on the insider trades. Our first initiative is to identify the reported insider transactions
from background trades on the same stocks recorded in the transaction database. This results in
an intraday sample that has the exact transaction time for each identified insider trade in addition
to other information available in the SEC data.
We include only the open market purchases and sales by corporate officers, directors, and
large shareholders on the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and the NASDAQ
stocks for a 15-year period January 1, 1988-December 31, 2002. The background trading on the
stocks in the insider trade data are taken from the Institute for the Study of Security Markets
(ISSM) transaction database for the period January 1988-December 1992 and the Trade and
Quote (TAQ) transaction database for the period January 1993-December 2002. Both databases
provide a detailed time stamped chronology of each TAQ for NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks
over the same period. The trade data include the transaction price, volume, time of execution, and
originating exchange of the trade. The quote data include the ask price, bid price, depth on both
sides, posting time of the quote, and originating exchange of the quote. Trade size and quoted
depths are measured in round lots of 100 shares and times of trade executions and quote postings
are to the nearest second. The official tick size has evolved considerably during the sample period.
The official tick size is one-eighth for all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks during the 1988-1992
period covered by the ISSM database as well as the period until June 1997. In June 1997, the
tick size is reduced to one-sixteenth by the exchanges. Finally, the decimalization of stock price
quotations takes place in several phases from August 28, 2000 to April 9, 2001. We consider all
these changes while identifying insider trades.3 The ISSM and TAQ databases also contain some
trade prices quoted to one-sixteenth over 1988-1997. While they are quite uncommon, we treated
these price quotes as valid prices.
Our primary method of identifying the insider trades from the background trading on the stocks
is to match the price and size of each reported insider transaction with those trades recorded in
the ISSM and TAQ databases. The reported insider transaction prices are rounded to the cent.
While most of these reported prices are rounded up, some are rounded down. Therefore, we allow
for a maximum of a half cent difference in either direction when matching the prices. This price
volume matching is also used by Cornell and Sirri (1992) to identify a small sample of illegal
insider purchases of Campbell Taggart stock in 1982.
We start by checking whether the reported insider trade has a matching ticker symbol in the
ISSM or TAQ databases for identification purposes. Given a valid ticker symbol, the second filter
ensures that the firm has a valid market price. If the insider trade passes these two filters, then
2After August 29, 2002, insiders are required to report their trades within two business days. Insiders may also voluntarily
file “proposed sales” with the SEC in advance if they plan to sell shares. However, they can choose to sell shares at any
time within the next six months after this pretrade filing. If they plan to purchase shares, they are not required to do any
pretrade filings and they typically do not file with the SEC before the purchases.
3Decimalization phases for NYSE stocks were on August 28, 2000 (7 stocks), September 25, 2000 (57 stocks), December
4, 2000 (94 stocks), and January 29, 2001 (all stocks). NASDAQ transition phases were on March 12 (14 stocks), March
25 (197 stocks), and April 9 (all stocks), all in 2001. For AMEX, August 28, 2000 and September 25, 2000 phases were
followed by the third and final phase on April 9, 2001. We follow each stock’s decimalization date while matching the
insider trade.
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our third filter attempts to identify a valid trade size.4 The fourth filter eliminates multiple insider
trades that take place on the same date with the same size and price at the same firm.5 Our fifth
filter requires a unique price volume match to the insider trade so that it can be included in the
final intraday sample. The sixth filter requires that each uniquely matched trade be executed at the
same exchange on which the stock is listed. Finally, the seventh filter requires that the uniquely
matched trade take place during the regular trading hours of 9:30 a.m.-4 p.m. to extract overnight
trading issues.
After running through the seven filters, our intraday sample has 177,745 insider trades from
1988 to 2002, with 65,845 insider purchases and 111,900 insider sales, respectively. The annual
number of insider trades in the intraday sample ranges from 6,732 in 1991 to 19,194 in 2001.
B. Sample Characteristics
In Table I , we report the trade size distribution, the firm size distribution of the intraday sample,
and prices of the insider trades in relation to their average prevailing bid and ask prices. Lee and
Ready (1991) find that bid-ask quotes may be recorded ahead of the trades that triggered them.
They propose to use the most recent quote that is recorded at least five seconds prior to time of
the trade as the prevailing bid-ask quote. We adopt this rule, which is also widely used in the
literature.
Panel A demonstrates that there are significantly smaller and medium size trades than there are
large ones. For example, 20,995 trades are fewer than 500 shares, 18,811 trades are from 500 to
1,000 shares, 102,212 trades are from 1,000 to 10,000 shares, but only 4,270 trades are more than
50,000 shares. The insider trades in our intraday sample are significantly smaller than typical
institutional trades, and more so for purchases than for sales (Chan and Lakonishok, 1993).
We classify firm sizes of stocks in the intraday sample on a scale of 1-10, where 1 represents the
10% smallest stock and 10 represents the 10% largest stocks in terms of market capitalizations
in each year during 1988-2002. This size classification is based on the deciles of equity market
values of all the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks at the beginning of the year. Panel B reports
statistics based on four firm size groups with market capitalization deciles of 1-3, 4-6, 7-8, and
9-10, respectively. In terms of the number of trades, there are more insider purchases than sales
in small firms (Size Deciles 1-3) and there are more sales than purchases in large firms (Size
Deciles 4-6, 7-8, and 9-10).
As indicated in Panel C, among all the insider purchases, 65.9%, 5.3%, and 28.8% of those
transactions are executed at prices higher than, equal to, or less than the average prevailing bid
and ask prices. Among insider sales, 69.8%, 5.4%, and 24.8% of those trades are executed at
prices less than, equal to, or higher than the average of the prevailing bid and ask prices. We
classify a purchase as a market order if its trade price is at the midpoint of the bid-ask price or
above. Otherwise, it is defined as a limit order. We identify a sale as a market order if its trade
price is at the midpoint of the bid-ask price or below. Otherwise, it is referred to as a limit order.
4While a majority of the reported insider trades are in hundreds of shares, a small fraction of them are not. Since the
trade sizes in the ISSM and TAQ databases are always rounded to hundreds of shares, we allow the same rounding when
matching the volumes for this small fraction of insider trades. For example, on June 6, 1990, a vice president at the Dayton
Hudson Corporation sold 6,074 shares at the reported price of $72.63. Based on our matching criterion, this insider trade
will be matched to the ISSM trade with a price of $72.625 and volume of 6,100 shares.
5We check the sensitivity of our results to this filter by including all days with multiple trades. 24,900 such trades, of
which 11,486 are purchases and 13,414 sales, are added to the final sample without this filter. Neither the trade-by-trade
abnormal return results before and after the insider sale/purchase nor the cumulative abnormal average stock return
patterns around the insider sale/purchase vary other than a negligible loss of significance without the filter. These results
are available upon request.
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Table I. Summary Statistics on Matched Insider Trades
This table presents the trade size distribution, the firm size distribution of the matched insider trades, and the
correlations of insider trade prices to the average prevailing bid-ask prices. The firm size classification for
each year from 1988 to 2002 is based on deciles of equity market values of all New York Stock Exchange,
American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ stocks at the beginning of the year. Decile 1 represents the
10% smallest firms and Decile 10 represents the 10% largest firms. The prevailing bid-ask quote for each
matched insider trade is the most recent quote that is recorded at least five seconds prior to time of the trade,
according to Lee and Ready (1991).
Panel A. Trade Size Distribution
Number [100, 500) [500, 1,000) [1,000, 10,000) [10,000, 50,000) ≥ 50,000 Total
of Shares
Purchases 13,014 9,600 35,966 6,432 833 65,845
Sales 7,981 9,211 66,246 25,025 3,437 111,900
Total 20,995 18,811 102,212 31,457 4,270 177,745
Panel B. Firm Size Distribution
Size Decile 1-3 4-6 7-8 9-10 Total
Purchases 13,792 25,199 15,849 11,005 65,845
Sales 10,023 31,565 33,026 37,286 111,900
Total 23,815 56,764 48,875 48,291 177,745
Panel C. Insider Trade Price Relative to Average Bid-Ask Prices
Price > Average Price = Average Price < Average Total
Bid-Ask Bid-Ask Bid-Ask
Purchases 43,408 (65.9%) 3,486 (5.3%) 18,951 (28.8%) 65,845 (100%)
Sales 27,778 (24.8%) 5,991 (5.4%) 78,131 (69.8%) 111,900 (100%)
We also experimented with two additional definitions of market and limit orders when the trade
price was exactly equal to the midpoint of the bid and ask prices. From Table I, these trades
constitute about 5% of the overall sample. First, we excluded all these trades. Alternatively, we
included these trades as part of the limit orders. In either case, all our qualitative conclusions
hold. It appears that corporate insiders often use limit orders. Since their private information
is not likely to be revealed to the market soon, insiders are in no hurry to execute trades and
would prefer to have better control over prices. These numbers also illustrate the importance of
identifying the directions of insider trades. If we did not recognize the trade directions and instead
used a classification scheme such as the quote test, at least 28.8% of insider purchases would
be classified as seller initiated and at least 24.8% of insider sales would be classified as buyer
initiated.6 This would result in a sample of buyer-initiated trades with insiders as buyers of some
trades but sellers of other trades. This would be similarly true for a sample of seller-initiated
trades. Lack of trade direction knowledge would make it very difficult to detect the true price
impacts of insider trades.
6A quote test classifies a trade to be buyer or seller initiated if the trade price is higher or lower than its prevailing average
bid-ask price. If the trade price is equal to the average bid-ask price, then further classifications are often used.
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II. Stock Prices around Insider Trades
A. Preliminaries
In this section, we investigate the following empirical questions: 1) Is there a price impact
from insider trading immediately prior to, at the time of trade, or immediately thereafter? 2)
Is there a price impact from insider trading by the end of the trading day? 3) How are price
impacts related to various trade attributes? and 4) Do insiders place both market and limit orders
to take advantage of their private information? The answers to the first three questions aid us in
understanding whether the presence of insiders is discovered at the time of trade and how private
information possessed by insiders is assimilated into prices through trading. The answer to the
last question helps us to understand the behavior of informed traders.
We analyze these issues by examining the intraday behavior of stock prices around insider
trades using trade-to-trade abnormal returns. We also conducted the analysis using unadjusted
trade-to-trade raw returns. The results are essentially the same. The abnormal returns are raw
returns adjusted for returns on a composite market index, which is used minute by minute over the
sample period from January 1, 1988 to December 31, 2002. The index is provided by the Institute
for Financial Markets and actually has an approximate frequency of four times per minute. The
average index value for that minute is used to calculate the corresponding abnormal return.
To fix notation, we denote each insider trade as Trade 0. That is, we center the intraday sample
at the insider trades. The trade prior to each insider trade is denoted as Trade − 1 and the next
trade after each insider trade is denoted as Trade 1. All the other trades prior to and following
an insider trade are similarly indexed. The price of the tth trade around the ith insider trade is
denoted as Pt,i. Corresponding to each tth trade, Mt,i refers to the level of the value-weighted
market index at the same minute as that trade.
We now provide a preliminary look at the price impact of insider trading by plotting the cumu-
lative trade-by-trade averages of abnormal returns, CAARt, for 60 trades before and after insiders’
transactions separately for purchases and sales as shown in Figure 1. Prior to insiders’ purchases,
prices tend to drop. Immediately preceding insiders’ purchases (the last three trades), prices seem
to stabilize, giving no hint of the impending insiders’ purchases. On insiders’ purchases, prices
rise significantly from the previous trade. This is the largest price change in the entire graph.
Following insiders’ purchases, prices continue to drift upward for the rest of the day.
A similar picture emerges around insiders’ sales Prices tend to rise slightly prior to insiders’ sales
and decline directly after insiders’ sales. In contrast to insiders’ purchases, there is no downward
drift following insiders’ sales. Instead, prices tend to bounce back up and then stabilize.
Instead of examining stock price reaction on a trade-by-trade basis, we also examined stock
price reactions for 10- and 30-second intervals. Once again, immediate stock price reaction to
insiders’ transactions is evident. Stock prices climb for the next trade after insiders’ purchases
even if that trade occurs within ten seconds.
Overall, our preliminary evidence suggests that insiders’ trades are discovered at the time of
the trade. This is likely to be due to the fact that insiders have to disclose their insider identity
to the brokers at the time they open their accounts. Consequently, arrival of a trade from an
insider account at that time has substantial price effects. Looking at prior price effects, in both
purchases and sales, insiders seem to be leaning against the prevailing prior price drift. The arrival
of insiders’ trades results in substantial initial price effects, positive for purchases and negative
for sales. Finally, long-term price effects of purchases and sales seem to diverge. For purchases,
it appears that there is a continuing price impact, while for sales the majority of the price effect
appears to be temporary and reversed following insiders’ sales. Hence, upward drift following
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Figure 1. Trade-by-Trade Abnormal Stock Price Reactions around Insiders’
Sales and Purchases (Trade 0)
insiders’ purchases suggests that a purchase order from an insider generates additional purchase
orders from market professionals, leading to continuing positive price effects. In contrast, an
insider sale does not seem to generate piggy-backing subsequent trades. We now proceed to a
more detailed and formal examination of the trade-by-trade price effects of insiders’ transactions.
In the remainder of this paper, we focus on holding-period abnormal returns. We compute three
groups of abnormal returns to study the initial impact of insider trades, subsequent price reaction,
and price behavior before the insider trades, respectively. First, the initial impact of insider trades
is examined using the abnormal return of Trade 1 to Trade 0. This return (for the ith insider trade)
is computed as
AR0,i = (ln P0,i − ln P−1,i ) − (ln M0,i − ln M−1,i ). (1)
Second, the subsequent price reaction is examined using the holding-period abnormal returns
of Trade 0 to later trades. They are computed as
ARt,i = (ln Pt,i − ln P0,i ) − (ln Mt,i − ln M0,i ), (2)
where t > 0. The long-horizon returns show whether the initial impact of insider trades reverses,
persists, or further increases through trading. We further define the total price impact at the tth
trade to be AR0,i + ARt,i, the sum of initial and subsequent impacts. Third, to examine price
behavior prior to insider trades, we compute holding period abnormal returns of trades prior to
insider trades relative to Trade −1 as
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ARt,i = (ln P−1,i − ln Pt,i ) − (ln M−1,i − ln Mt,i ), (3)
where t < −1.
B. Insider Purchases
1. Price Behavior
We conduct separate analyses for insider purchases and insider sales. In Table II, we report
the evidence regarding price behavior around insider purchases. These results are based on three
trade size groups: 1) small trades (100-999 shares), 2) medium trades (1,000-9,999 shares), and
3) large trades or block trades (10,000 shares or greater). Within each trade size group, we report
results on abnormal returns of Trades −60, −15, −5, and −2 to Trade −1; abnormal return of
Trade −1 to Trade 0; and abnormal returns of Trade 0 to Trades 1, 2, 5, 15, and 60. All these
trades are required to be executed on the same day as the insider trades.7 For each abnormal
return, we compute the following statistics: 1) mean abnormal return, 2) p-value from the t-test
for testing if the mean abnormal return is zero, 3) median abnormal return, and 4) p-value from
the signed rank test to determine whether the median abnormal return is zero. We also computed
p-values using an alternative method. In order to account for possible dependence in the data,
we calculated standard errors and, consequently, the p-values in the spirit of Fama and MacBeth
(1973). Following their procedure, we computed mean abnormal returns for each month of the
180-month sample period. We utilized the monthly variability in the abnormal mean returns to
compute the p-values.
First, let us examine price behavior before insider purchases through the abnormal returns of
Trades (−60, −1), (−15, −1), and (−2, −1). If any of the mean or median abnormal returns
are negative, it indicates that prices, on average, have declined from that trade to Trade −1. We
find that for all trade size groups, the mean abnormal returns before insider purchases are often
significantly negative. For instance, the mean abnormal returns of Trades (−60, −1) and (−15,
−1) are −86 basis points and −27 basis points for the small trades, −94 basis points and −31
basis points for the medium trades, and −79 basis points and −38 basis points for the block trades,
respectively. These numbers demonstrate a consistent and significant trend of declining prices
prior to insider purchases regardless of trade size. We observe the same pattern from median
values as well. Median abnormal returns of Trades (−60, −1) and (−15, −1) are −36 and −8
basis points for the small trades, −33 and −5 basis points for the medium trades, and −24 and
−4 basis points for the large trades, respectively. All values are statistically significant.
The initial, contemporaneous price impact (mean abnormal return of Trade −1 to Trade 0) of
insider purchases are about 97 basis points for the small trades, 102 basis points for the medium
trades, and 102 basis points for the large trades. The initial impact of all trade size groups is
highly statistically significant. Moreover, the initial median abnormal returns are also positive
and significant with 21, 20, and 25 basis points for each trade size group, respectively. This
finding suggests that the initial price impact is not produced by a few outliers.
For small trades, all of the mean abnormal returns of Trade 0 to Trades 1, 2, 5, 15, and 60
are significantly positive. Thus, prices continue to rise after insider purchases. There is no price
reversal at all after the initial price impact. The subsequent price impact reaches 44 basis points at
7We also experimented with the three-trading-day (trades are required to be executed from one day before to one day after
insider trades) and five-trading-day windows. All the results are qualitatively the same. Increase of number of trading
days in the window makes the impact of insider trades more significant, as more observations from less liquid stocks are
included in the analysis.
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the 60th trade after insider purchases. The total price impact, defined as the sum of the initial and
subsequent impacts, is 1.41% ( = 0.97% + 0.44%) at the 60th trade after the insider purchase.
The median value of the total price impact is 51 (= 21 + 30) basis points at the 60th trade. We
see similar patterns in the mean abnormal returns and median abnormal returns of medium and
large trade groups subsequent to the initial price impact. All subsequent returns are positive and
significant. For example, prices rise by 63 basis points and 77 basis points for medium and large
trades, respectively, beyond the initial impact by the 60th trade. Thus, using mean abnormal re-
turns, the total price impact at the 60th trade is 1.65% (= 1.02% + 0.63%) and 1.79% (= 1.02% +
0.77%) for medium and large trades, respectively. Using median abnormal returns, the total price
impact is 48 (= 20 + 28) basis points and 47 (= 25 + 22) basis points for medium trades and
large trades, respectively.
2. Matching Control Sample
While insider purchases appear to have both initial and subsequent price impact, we need to
establish whether the price impact of insider purchases is different from those of noninsider trades
with similar characteristics. In particular, we want to separate the effects of trade size, prior price
movements, bid-ask bounce, and firm size from the fact that insiders are buyers. To proceed, we
first classify the trade characteristics of insider purchases into:
1. Six groups in trade size: (100-500), (500-1,000), (1,000-5,000), (5,000-10,000), (10,000-
50,000), and > 50,000 shares.
2. Three groups in prior price change: P0,i > P−60,i , P0,i = P−60,i , and P0,i < P−60,i , where
P0,i is the price of the insider trade and P−60,i is the price of the 60th trade prior to the
insider trade.
3. Three groups according to whether the insider purchase prices are greater than, equal to,
or less than the average prevailing bid-ask prices.
We then construct a random sample of noninsider trades by identifying another trade on the
same stock during the same year that matches all three characteristics. We only search for those
trades that were at least seven trading days apart from the corresponding insider purchases. It
is possible that the control period likely differs from the insider trading period in stock price
volatility, even with the match on prior price change. Given that market makers may be concerned
about volatility, we examine this issue separately and determine whether there may be an additional
need for a more explicit match on volatility (Andersen et al., 2001, examine the importance and
necessity of considering stock volatility when using high-frequency data).
We calculated the volatilities using the 60 trades prior the insider trade and the 60 trades
before the matched trade. We then compared the volatility measures to see whether there is a
statistical difference.8 Using the trade-by-trade returns of the 60 prior trades, we calculated the
time-series volatility for each insider purchase separately. We then did the same for the matched
trade and compared the average volatilities. These volatility measures are 0.0993% and 0.0959%
based on the insider trades and the matched trades, respectively. The F-test does not reject the
8We also used midpoints of bid and ask quotes to take into account the potential biases in cases of infrequent or
nonsynchronous trading, in the spirit of Affleck-Graves, Hegde, and Miller (1994) and Nimalendran, Ritter, and Zhang
(2007) with similar conclusions.
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null hypothesis of no difference between volatility values at conventional significance levels
indicating that we also have a good match on volatility.9
Since we choose matching trades on the same stocks in the same year, in effect, we have a firm
fixed-effects control for all firm-specific characteristics including firm size. The only difference is
that insiders are buyers in the insider sample, while for the noninsider sample, buyers are randomly
selected market participants. By using exactly the same methods as before, we compute the same
trade-to-trade abnormal returns around these noninsider trades. We then compare the price impacts
of the two samples.
In Table II, we report mean abnormal returns for both insider and noninsider trades and the
p-values from testing the differences of the two means. The mean abnormal returns of prior trades
to Trade −1 are negative for the insider purchases indicating declining prices prior to the trade.
Conversely, noninsider trades generally have insignificant prior price changes from Trade −60 to
Trade 0. The two samples differ significantly in their price impact. For small, medium, and large
trades, the initial impact (mean abnormal return of Trade −1 to Trade 0) of insider purchases is
larger than that of noninsider trades, and the difference is significant at the 1% level. The initial
impact of noninsider trades is also positive. However, the subsequent price behavior after Trade
0 is very different between the two samples. We have seen that insider purchases result in further
subsequent price impact, as the mean abnormal returns of Trade 0 to Trade 60 are 44, 63, and 77
basis points for the small, medium, and large trades, respectively. In contrast, in the noninsider
sample, the mean abnormal returns of Trade 0 to Trade 60 are all insignificant with −12, 9, and 12
basis points. The subsequent return has virtually reversed all the initial impact of the noninsider
trades in the small trade group. There is also a temporary price reversal from Trade 0 to Trade 5
for the medium size trades and from Trade 0 to Trade 15 for the large size trades after the initial
impact.10
3. Piggy-Backing on Insider Trades and Trading Intensity
Our next task is to investigate the extent to which market professionals use their recently
discovered knowledge regarding the arrival of an insider trade. First, piggy-backing on insiders’
trades is unlikely to be illegal.11 Second, since we do not have access to proprietary data about
market professionals’ trading decisions or their inventory positions, we examine the number
of trades and the direction of trades around insiders’ transactions. Given that insiders do not
publicly report their trades for anywhere from 2 to 40 days, at the time of their trade only the
market professionals may be aware of the insiders’ orders. Of course, another possibility is that
insiders themselves may follow up their initial trades with subsequent trades. We rule out this
possibility later in the paper. We expect that market professionals will want to imitate insiders’
trades to take advantage of the insiders’ information after they execute the order. They will want
9As an alternative, we computed the cross-sectional volatility of the returns obtained from the 60th and 59th trades prior
to all insider trades and recorded the average. We repeated the computation for the prior returns (based on 59th and 58th
trades, 58th and 57th trades, etc.). The average of these volatilities is 0.1083%. Alternatively, the average of the volatilities
obtained from the matched noninsider trades using the same procedure is 0.1042%. These two measure are, again, not
statistically different. We repeated the analysis by using both the 60 trades before and 60 trades after the insider (and the
matched) purchase with similar conclusions.
10Including days with duplicate insider trades leaves the results based on median returns virtually unchanged for all trade
sizes. For mean return based results, large trades are again unaffected while small trades demonstrate a small attenuation.
Hence, our results are not sensitive to Filter 4.
11We know of no prosecutions in an insider piggy-backing case. Even the US attorney for Manhattan, James Comey,
stated that indicting Martha Stewart for insider trading in a piggy-back case would have been unprecedented. See Forbes,
“Martha’s Goose on Slow Burn,” June 5, 2003.
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to buy following an insider purchase, and sell following an insider sale for either proprietary
trading accounts or favored clients’ trading accounts. Moreover, they will want to do this quickly
before others begin to exploit the same information and reposition prices. Consequently, if market
professionals use the information about insiders’ trades, we would anticipate the trading activity
to intensify. Moreover, we expect market professionals to put in market orders and shift order
imbalances in the same direction as the insider trade.
The intensity of trading activity is examined in Figure 2. In the top portion of the figure,
we compute the number of trades within each 10-second interval, five minutes prior to and
five minutes after insiders’ trades. For each firm, we then divide the number of trades by the
average number to normalize the intensity. We then average these across insiders’ trades to
compute the average trading intensity.
This figure indicates that there is nothing unusual occurring prior to insiders’ trades. How-
ever, the arrival of an insider purchase order increases the trading intensity (number of trades)
immediately. Following insiders’ purchases, trading intensity increases by about 60% and stays at
this level for roughly 20 seconds. This increase in trading intensity is significant at the 1% level.
Trading intensity then begins to taper down after this point. However, even after five minutes,
trading intensity is still approximately 10% above the preinsider trading intensity level. Figure
2 is consistent with the hypothesis that market professionals increase their trading activity as a
result of insiders’ purchase orders.
The upper portion of Figure 2 also illustrates the changes in trading intensity following insiders’
sales. Immediately following insiders’ sell orders, trading intensity increases by about 20%. This
number is significant at the 10% level. However, the increase in trading intensity immediately
tapers off to normal levels one minute after the insiders’ sell order. This evidence suggests that
insiders’ sell orders do not generate as much subsequent trading activity as insiders’ purchase
orders.
We also replicated trading intensity using number of shares traded instead of number of trades.
These results are similar and are summarized in the bottom portion of Figure 2. Following insiders’
purchases, the number of shares traded rises by more than 50%. This increase is significant at the
1% level. Even after five minutes, the increase in trading intensity is 25% above the preinsider
purchase levels. Following insiders’ sales, number of shares traded increases by 15%. This
increase is statistically significant at the 10% level.
4. Piggy-Backing on Insider Trades and Order Imbalances
While Figure 2 reveals an increase in trading activity immediately following insiders’ trades,
it does not tell us anything about the direction of increased trades. To determine whether higher
trading intensity occurs in the same direction as insiders’ trades, we compute order imbalances.
Following the literature, we define order imbalance as the net difference between buyer- and seller-
initiated orders around an insider trade (we exclude insider trade itself from this computation).
Order imbalance can generally be defined over a certain time period or for a certain group of
sequential trades. A trade is defined as buyer- or seller-initiated based on how close it is to the
prevailing bid-ask quote. The prevailing quote is determined, as in Section I.B, following Lee
and Ready (1991). The Lee and Ready (1992) algorithm classifies a trade as buyer-initiated if it
is closer to the ask price of the prevailing quote. Similarly, a trade is seller initiated if it is closer
to the bid price of the prevailing quote. If the trade is at exactly the midpoint of the quote, a tick
test is used. If the last price change prior to the trade is positive, the trade is classified as buyer
initiated. Alternatively, the trade is seller initiated if the last price change prior to the trade is
negative.
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Figure 2. Normalized Trading Intensity around Insiders’ Trades
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The price and volume information of the 60 trades before and after each insider trade in
relation to their corresponding prevailing bid-ask quotes is used to define three different order
imbalance measures following Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005). In order imbalance
in numbers (OIB#), a trade is buyer (seller) initiated if it is given a value of 1 (−1). Order
imbalance in volume (OIBsh) assigns the positive (negative) value of the number of shares to the
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buyer- (seller-) initiated trade. Finally, order imbalance in dollars (OIB$) assigns the positive
(negative) value of the product of the share price with the number of shares traded to the buyer-
(seller-) initiated trade. The first measure, OIB#, disregards the size of the trade, counting small
orders equally with large orders. The second and third measures weigh large orders more heavily.
Figure 3 illustrates the cumulative order imbalances around the insider trades.12 Initially,
between trades −60 to −30, the cumulative order imbalance is flat, indicating neither buying nor
selling pressure in the marketplace due to market orders. Starting around trade −20, sell-initiated
orders predominate and the cumulative order imbalance begins to decline sharply. This indicates
negative sentiment in the marketplace prior to insiders’ purchases consistent with the price picture
in Figure 1.
The arrival of the insiders’ purchase orders (whether it is a market or limit order) completely
reverses the order imbalances. Following insiders’ purchases, the order imbalance pattern reverses
and increases. We see similar patterns in cumulative normalized OIBsh and OIB$ plots as well.
It is evident that the orders following insiders’ purchase orders also are buyer initiated. For all
three measures of order imbalances, increases in order imbalances are significant at the 1% level.
Our evidence thus far establishes that the arrival of insiders’ purchase orders leads to sustained
price increases, increase in trading intensity, and a predominance of buyer-initiated orders. Given
that only market professionals may be aware of the insiders’ purchase orders, the evidence is
consistent with piggy-backing by market professionals.13
Piggy-backing on insider trades provides another mechanism for market professionals to reduce
their adverse selection costs and allows them to offer reduced trading costs overall. We now
examine whether greater initial stock price reaction, as well as piggy-backing of insider trades,
facilitates greater incorporation of insider information into prices than in noninsider trading
cases. To formally investigate this issue, we consider a vector autoregression (VAR) model below,
following Hasbrouck (1991a).
5. Measuring Speed and Degree of Information Incorporation into Prices
We use a simple linear bivariate model where, following the Hasbrouck (1991a) notation, the
interaction between the price change, rt, and the trade indicator variable, x0 (+1 for a buy order
and −1 for a sell order) are examined. In order to distinguish the influence of insider trades, the
original VAR model is augmented to measure the additional impact, if any, of insider trades. The
dummy variables, Di, which are defined to be equal to one if the trade is an insider trade and
zero otherwise, are multiplied with the augmented portion to estimate the difference in variable


































t−i + ν2,t .
(4)
12Once again, order imbalance values are normalized by dividing by the sum of the absolute order imbalance values of
the 60 trades before and after each insider trade. The normalized values are then averaged for Trade − 60 through Trade
60, cumulated over the trades around insider purchases and insider sales separately, and normalized one more time so that
the insider trade (Trade 0) is defined as zero. Order imbalance measures are scaled in alternative ways in other studies as
well (Hughen and McDonald, 2006).
13These graphical patterns are similar for different insider trade characteristics. Order imbalance plots for NYSE versus
NASDAQ listed companies, size of the trade, top executives versus other insiders, and small versus large companies are
similar to those reported here. These results are not presented for brevity.
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Figure 3. Cumulative Order Imbalances
The imbalance values are based on number of trades (Oib#), number shares traded (Oibsh), and dollar value
of trade (Oib$) around insider’s purchases.
The summation for the trade variables start from i = 0, while the quote revision sum begins at
i = 1.14
The results are reported in Table III. The interactions between trades and quote reactions are
different for informed insider trades and uninformed noninsider trades. There is a larger reaction
to insider trades and this reaction is both faster and longer lasting when compared to noninsider
trades. Although there are 60 variable lags as explanatory variables, only the first five are reported
for brevity. In addition, the sum of the estimated 60 lag coefficients along with the corresponding
t-statistic is reported.
Quote revision regressions are reported in the first group of columns. The coefficients of x0,
the trade indicator, indicate that after a purchase (sell) order, the quote midpoint is increased
(decreased) by the market maker (β1,0 = 0.096 is significantly positive). The increase (decrease)
is significantly larger if that order originates from an insider (β2,0 = 0.027 is additionally positive
with 1% significance). If the order originates from an uninformed trader, longer lag quote
revisions are insignificantly different from zero, summarized by the sum of the coefficients,∑
β1,i = −0.001, which is not statistically significant. If the order originates from an insider, the
14Two econometric issues were considered. First, in order to determine the number of lags to be used as explanatory
variables, Akaike information criterion and Sawa’s Bayesian information criterion were used. Both criteria indicated
the use of 60 variable lags as explanatory variables in the first VAR system and 30 lags in the second VAR system.
We experimented with lags ranging from 20 to 60, and the conclusions remained the same. We report results based
on estimations with the number of lags suggested by the information criteria. The second econometric issue was the
possibility of nonstationarity. Analysis using Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests did not indicate evidence for nonstationarity.
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longer lags are also positive and significant (summarized by
∑
β2,i = 0.064, which is positive
and significant at 5%). Thus, the market maker increases the quotes following both insider and
noninsider purchases. Quote revisions following insider purchases are greater and continue for
the next 60 trades resulting in a fuller reaction to insider purchases.
Trade regressions are reported in the second column. Noninsider purchases tend to follow price
increases indicated by positive and significant γ 1,i coefficients in both the short term and the
long term (
∑
γ1,i = 1.218 is statistically positive at 1% significance), while insider trades tend
to exhibit a contrarian pattern as seen from negative γ 2,i values (long term,
∑
γ2,i = −1.595 is
significantly negative). Consistent with our previous results summarized in Figure 1, prior to an
insider purchase (sale), the stock prices drop (rise). The coefficients of past trade variables, δ∗,i,
indicate the typical positive autocorrelation that Hasbrouck (1991a) reports. Buy (sell) orders are
followed by buy (sell) orders and we do not see evidence of reversals in the long run. Insider
trades also demonstrate the same tendency to follow previous insider trades in the same direction
as the dummy variable coefficient is insignificantly different from zero at conventional levels.
While not revealed here, we also estimated a nonlinear VAR system. In addition to quote revision
and trade indicator variables, we also included the signed trade size and the signed quadratic trade
size. The nonlinear system produced similar results to the linear system. As demonstrated before
in the rt estimation, if the order is uninformed, the net market maker reaction is an insignificant
change in the opposite direction. Conversely, if the order is from an insider, the net effect is
significant and in the same direction as that of the insider trade. The quadratic trade volume
exhibits an opposite, but insignificant, impact on quote revision. In the case of insider trades, the
trade volume has a concave impact on quote revision as documented in Hasbrouck (1991a).
The above results indicate that insider trades facilitate speedier incorporation of information
into prices than in noninsider trading instances. There is a greater initial price reaction, followed
by additional price changes in the same direction, resulting in fuller stock price reactions to insider
trades. The piggy-backing of market makers on insider trades appears to be another mechanism
for reducing adverse selection costs. We further examine this phenomenon with trade attributes
below.
C. Stock Price Reaction and Trade Attributes
Our next task is to analyze whether the price reaction is dependent solely on the publicly
observable trade attributes, or whether nonpublic attributes also matter. If nonpublic attributes,
such as the hierarchy of an insider’s relationship to the firm, are also reflected in the price reaction,
then this finding would further strengthen the case that the presence of insiders is discovered and
incorporated into the stock price at the time of trade. Previous research has indicated that the
value of insiders’ information depends on trade size, firm size, and insiders’ status. In addition,
stock price reaction is expected to be related to order type. For instance, Seyhun (1998) confirms
that, historically, insider trades at small firms are more informative than those at large firms.
Also, a larger volume of trading is associated with more valuable information than a smaller
volume. Seyhun (1986) and Chiang and Venkatesh (1988) argue that large shareholders are less
informed than officers and directors, and Griffiths et al. (2000) find that information content of
trades is positively related to the order type on the Toronto Stock Exchange.
To take into account the interrelations among these variables, we estimate multivariate linear
regressions for cumulative abnormal returns around insider purchases:
CARt,T,i = α0 + α1MEDIUM + α2LARGE + α3SMALLCAP
+α4TOPEXEC + α5OFFICER + α6MARKET + εt,i ,
(5)
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where the regressors are respective dummy variables for medium trade size, large trade size, firm
size Deciles 1-6, top executive insiders, nontop executive officers, and market orders. Recall that
we define an insider purchase as a market order if its trade price is at the midpoint of the bid-ask
price or above. Otherwise, it is a limit order. The dummy variable MARKET is equal to one for
market orders and zero otherwise. Other dummy variables are similarly assigned values of one or
zero.
The regression results are reported in Panel A of Table IV. The estimated coefficients of
the dummy variables for medium and large trade size (α1 and α2) generally corroborate our
earlier results. The coefficients α1 (on MEDIUM) and α2 (on LARGE) are positive for the
abnormal return of Trade −1 to Trade 0. In other words, medium and large trades have a bigger
initial price impact than small trades. Both coefficients for the subsequent returns are positive
and significant, in general. However, there are also some statistically insignificant negative
point estimates, suggesting that the total price impact of small insider purchases is not very
different from those of medium insider purchases and large insider purchases. These results in the
multivariate regressions are largely consistent with the previous findings in the univariate context.
Even small insider purchases (between 100 and 1,000 shares) can be very informative and have a
significant total price impact. On an intraday basis, the price impact of insider purchases is quite
similar with respect to trade size. However, there is also some evidence of slightly higher total
returns with trade size.
The estimates of coefficient α3 (on SMALLCAP) are significantly positive for the abnormal
returns of Trade −1 to Trade 0 and of Trade 0 to most subsequent trades. Thus, insider purchases
in smaller firms result in significantly higher initial and subsequent price impacts than those in
larger firms. On an intraday basis, evidence indicates that insiders’ purchases in small firms are
more informative than those of large firms.
We now consider price reaction to then nonpublic information about insiders’ type. At the time
of the trade, only some market professionals may be aware of the insider trading and specifically
the insider’s relationship to the firm. If the insider’s identity does not matter, then the price reaction
should be explained by publicly observable trade characteristics such as firm size, trade size, and
order type. However, if market professionals pay attention to the identity of the insider, then the
hierarchy of the insider’s relationship to the firm will also matter.
Panel A indicates that the estimates of the coefficients α4 and α5 (on TOPEXEC and on
OFFICER) are significantly positive for the abnormal return of Trade −1 to Trade 0. This suggests
that after controlling for observable characteristics, the market’s initial reaction to purchases by
top executives is strongest, followed by that of officers and large shareholders. This finding is
consistent with the scenario that the identity of insiders provides additional information to market
participants.
D. Order Types
Next, we examine the effect of order types on stock price reaction. Panel A of Table IV confirms
that the estimates of coefficient α6 (on MARKET) are also positive for the abnormal return of
Trade −1 to Trade 0 but negative for the later abnormal returns. Apparently, the price impacts
are not simply driven by the order type. To get a fuller picture, we further partition insider
purchases into market and limit orders, and analyze the price impact of these two subsamples.
For comparison, we also conduct the same analysis on the noninsider sample. These results are
reported in Panel B.
Let us first look at the results on limit order insider purchases. The mean abnormal return of
Trade −1 to Trade 0 is −0.50% due to the definition of limit orders. However, following Trade 0,
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prices steadily rise and the mean abnormal return of Trade 0 to Trade 60 reaches 1.72%. Hence,
following their limit orders, insiders’ profit averages 1.72%. This evidence indicates that stock
prices drift upward significantly in reaction to limit purchases. The same pattern is also found
in the median abnormal returns of limit insider purchases. In comparison, the limit orders for
noninsider trades result in a similar initial price impact of −38 basis points, but a subsequent
price impact of only 23 basis points at the 60th trade, which is less than the absolute value of the
initial impact. While the initial price impact between insider and noninsider limit purchases is
statistically insignificant, subsequent returns of insider limit purchases are all statistically higher
than those of noninsiders. The large and sustained price increase after limit insider purchases is
unique to the insider trades.
Panel B also reports the results for market insider purchases. These purchases create an initial
price impact of 162 basis points, which is significantly larger than the 20-basis-point impact of
the noninsider market trades. There is a further subsequent price impact of 12 basis points at the
60th trade. Hence, following their market orders, insiders’ profits average only 12 basis points.
This is much lower than the 172 basis points on the subsequent impact of insider limit purchases.
This evidence indicates that insiders’ limit purchases are much more profitable as they avoid
paying the bid-ask spread for execution immediacy. Our finding suggests that some insiders are
patient in taking advantage of their private information and they use limit orders to gain better
control over prices if their private information is long lasting and will not be accompanied by a
rapid corporate announcement to the market. The insiders’ market purchases do result in quicker
dissemination of private information on a trade-by-trade basis, but other market participants
detect and act on insiders’ purchases regardless of the order type.
Our evidence so far corroborates some of the findings from the literature. Similar to Hasbrouck
(1991a, 1991b), we also find that the price impact is not immediately completed. Instead, the
price impact continues for the rest of the day. The price impact in our study also tends to increase
with trade size and is most pronounced in smaller firms. This is consistent with the evidence in
Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996), who find that information-based trading is higher
in smaller firms. Our evidence also corroborates the findings in Harris and Hasbrouck (1996),
who conclude that informed traders should do better by submitting limit orders rather than market
orders using SuperDOT trading even after taking the probability of execution into account. The
market microstructure and order type are also important factors as demonstrated in Jakob and
Ma (2005). We find that conditional on execution, insiders realize greater profits (172 basis
points) from limit orders than they do from market orders (12 basis points). These results suggest
that when insiders have monopolistic access to long-lived information, they can and do exploit
this better by submitting limit orders and thereby avoid paying for immediacy of execution. Our
evidence also cautions against characterizing market orders as information motivated trades and
limit orders as liquidity motivated trades.
E. Order Imbalances and Trade Attributes
We further examine the impact of order imbalance on abnormal returns around insider trans-
actions in multivariate linear regressions. We explore the interaction of order imbalance with
other trade attributes such as trade size, firm size, order type, and insiders’ status in time series
regressions. All three order imbalance measures are used separately in the regressions of the
abnormal returns in insider purchases and insider sales reported in Table V. Panel A uses OIB#
as the independent order imbalance measure. Panel B uses order imbalance in volume, OIBsh,
and Panel C uses order imbalance in dollars, OIB$, in the regressions. The results suggest that
order imbalances following insiders’ trades contribute positively to the price impact of insider
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trades. In contrast, order imbalances prior to insiders’ purchases contribute negatively to the price
impact. This finding suggests that the arrival of the insider trade reverses the price impact of
order imbalances.
Finally, we investigate the determinants of the reversals in order imbalances shown in Figure
3 using a multivariate regression analysis. Our dependent variable is the cumulative change in
order imbalances for various holding periods from (−1 to +1) to (−60 to +60).
OIBt,T,i = α0 + α1MEDIUM + α2LARGE + α3SMALLCAP
+α4TOPEXEC + α5OFFICER + α6MARKET + εt,i ,
(6)
where the regressors are respective dummy variables for medium trade size, large trade size,
firm size Deciles 1-6, top executives, nontop executive officers, and market orders. The dummy
variable MARKET is equal to one for market orders and zero otherwise. Other dummy variables
are similarly assigned values of one or zero.
The multivariate regression results are reported in Table VI. Panel A presents regressions where
the dependent variable is the cumulative change in the order imbalance based on numbers, OIB#.
Panel B and Panel C present regression results for the cumulative change in the order imbalance
based on volume and dollar value, respectively. We observe from the panels that reversals in
order imbalances (using all three measures) are more pronounced in small firms. Reversals in
order imbalances also increase with insiders’ trading volume. Larger purchases by insiders’ are
much more likely to lead to bigger reversals. Order imbalances also reverse to a greater extent
when insiders place limit orders. Finally, even though insider trading information is not yet made
public, order imbalance reversals are more pronounced for top executives’ and officers’ trades
than they are for large shareholders’ trades. All these effects are statistically significant at the 1%
level. These findings are consistent with our previous evidence regarding the impact of insider
trading.
F. Insider Sales
Thus far, our analyses have been for insider purchases. Given that there are almost twice as
many insider sales as there are purchases, an examination of insider sales is warranted, starting
with price behavior around insider sales by trade size groups. We first examine price behavior
prior to insider sales through the abnormal returns of Trades −60, −15, −5, and −2 to Trade −1.
Both the mean abnormal returns and median abnormal returns prior to insider sales are mostly
positive for small trades (100-999 shares), medium trades (1,000-9,999 shares), and large trades
(more than 10,000 shares). All positive median returns are also significant. For instance, the
median abnormal return of Trade −60 to Trade −1 is 5 basis points for small trades, 9 basis
points for medium trades, and 5 basis points for large trades. This means that prices have been
increasing prior to these insider sales.
The initial price impact (median abnormal return of Trade −1 to Trade 0) of insider sales is
about −4 basis points for small trades, −12 basis points for medium trades, and −26 basis points
for large trades. The initial impact of all trade size groups is statistically significant. The mean
abnormal returns are all significantly negative as well. However, the overall initial price impact
is completely reversed during the following trades. For instance, the median abnormal return of
Trade 0 to Trade 60 is 13 basis points for small trades, 28 basis points for medium trades, and
40 basis points for large trades. Initial mean abnormal returns of −5, −27, and −49 basis points
are also reversed with the subsequent mean returns of 34, 44, and 86 basis points from Trade
0 to Trade 60 for small, medium, and large trades, respectively. Thus, there is essentially no
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total impact from price decrease associated with insider sales. Insider sales only depress prices
temporarily at best. Prices quickly resume their climb after Trade 0.
We also compare the price impact of insider sales to that of a matched noninsider trade sample
constructed in exactly the same manner as the random sample matching insider purchases. That is,
the noninsider trades match the insider sales in terms of trade size, prior price movements, bid-ask
bounce, and firm size. When compared to this random sample, insider sales are characterized
by greater initial impact, but also greater subsequent reversals. The overall difference is small,
however, and neither sample exhibits total price impact. For brevity, we do not report the above
results, but they are available upon request.
We further estimate linear regressions of abnormal returns around insider sales on dummy
variables for several types of sales: 1) medium trade size, 2) large trade size, 3) firm size Deciles
1-6, 4) top executive insiders, 5) nontop executive officers, and 6) the order type of insider
sales. The regression results are reported in Table VII. The estimates of the coefficients α1
(on MEDIUM), α2 (on LARGE), and α3 (on SMALLCAP) are negative for abnormal return of
Trade −1 to Trade 0 but are positive afterward. In other words, insider sales of larger trades and
in smaller firms cause greater initial impact, but they also experience greater price reversals.
Conversely, the coefficients α4 (on TOPEXEC) and α5 (on OFFICER) are significantly negative
for the abnormal return of Trade −1 to Trade 0 and are negative and borderline significant for
the abnormal return of Trade 0 to Trade 60. Thus, sales of stock by top executives and officers
decrease prices, both initially and subsequently, more so than sales by other insiders such as large
shareholders.
Together with earlier evidence, these findings suggest that the lack of total price impact
for the sales group is entirely due to large shareholders. Typically, large shareholders trade
without information (Seyhun, 1998) and they trade large volumes of stock. Consequently, it is
not surprising that sales by large shareholders do not generate a price impact by the end of the
trading day.
In summary, we find that insider sales cause a significant initial price decrease but no total
price impact (overall sample). The initial impact is quickly reversed in the trades following insider
sales. Insiders are again contrarian since they typically sell after prices have gone up. There is,
however, both an initial and a subsequent price impact for top executives’ and officers’ sales,
though it is smaller than that of the purchases.
What causes weaker results for insider sales than for insider purchases? We know that insiders
are often given stock options as compensation. Once these options become vested and move in
the money, insiders typically exercise them, acquire the shares, and immediately sell the shares
on the open market to rebalance their portfolio. Some executive options contain a reload feature
that is only triggered when executives exercise these options and sell their existing shares to pay
the exercise money. Consequently, some of insider sales are triggered for liquidity or portfolio
rebalancing rather than for information purposes. In contrast, when insiders buy, it is more likely
to be information driven. Market participants appear to understand these distinctions and treat
insider sales as less informed than insider purchases (Seyhun, 1998). Consequently, insiders’
sales do not appear to elicit as much of a price reaction as insiders’ purchases.
We also investigated the initial and subsequent price reaction of insider trading separately
for NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. Given that AMEX and NASDAQ contain smaller firms,
we also find somewhat stronger results for AMEX and NASDAQ. For insiders’ purchases, the
price impact from Trade −1 to Trade +1 equals 76 basis points for NYSE, 132 basis points for
NASDAQ, and 249 basis points for AMEX. For insiders’ sales, the price impact from Trade −1
to Trade +1 equals −9 basis points for NYSE, −39 basis points for NASDAQ, and −14 basis
points for AMEX. For the sake of brevity, these results are not shown.
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We also find that while there is a larger initial reaction for AMEX and NASDAQ, the subsequent
price reaction to insiders’ trades appears to be exchange related. For both NYSE and AMEX
exchanges, the drift for purchases from Trades 0 to 60 is small and insignificantly different
from each other. For NASDAQ, the drift from Trades 0 to 60 is about 42 basis points and it is
significantly higher than that of NYSE. Our evidence suggests that the stock price reaction in
NASDAQ takes longer to be completed suggesting less transparency for NASDAQ. This finding
is similar to Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003).
G. Further Analysis and Robustness Tests
1. Bid-Ask Quotes
We have so far used trade-to-trade abnormal returns to analyze the price impact of insider trades.
To demonstrate that the detected price impact is not due to trade size, prior price movements,
bid-ask bounce, or firm size, we have compared insider trades with matched noninsider trades.
To further check the robustness of our results against bid-ask bounce, we replicate our analysis
using returns based solely on ask price quotes for insider purchases and returns based only on bid
price quotes for insider sales. Unlike transaction returns, the bid-to-bid and ask-to-ask returns
will not be affected by the bid-ask bounce at all (Koski and Michaely, 2000).
The ask-to-ask returns based results for insider purchases are similar to those in Table II. Prior
to insider purchases, quoted ask prices have been declining for all trade size groups. The initial
price impact, measured by ask-to-ask returns, is 63 basis points for small trades, 43 basis points
for medium trades, and 65 basis points for large trades. The median initial price impact with 15
basis points for small trades, 11 basis points for medium trades, and 33 basis points for large
trades is significant and positive as well. Thus, the initial price impact is positive and significant
regardless of the trade size group. Following insider purchases, quoted ask prices continue to
increase, causing significant total price impacts whose magnitude is similar to those measured
by trade-to-trade returns in Table II.
We also replicated the results on insider sales based on quoted bid prices only. The initial mean
price impact of insider sales for the three trade size groups are now −19, −35, and −43 basis
points compared to −5, −27, and −49 basis points measured by trade-to-trade returns. Initial
price impact with median values is also all negative, statistically significant, and similar to the
median values measured by trade-to-trade returns. Hence, the use of bid-to-bid returns attenuates
the initial impact of larger trades, but not insider sales in general. Following insider sales, all
initial impacts are reversed and bid prices resume their climb for the overall sample. Again, there
is no evidence of a total impact of insider sales. In summary, the results based on bid-to-bid and
ask-to-ask returns are essentially the same as those based on transaction returns.
2. Isolated Insider Trades
Thus far in our analysis, we have not considered how closely insider trades are clustered
together. If insiders execute multiple trades during the day, what we measure as subsequent drift
may actually be a contemporaneous reaction to a subsequent insider trade. To address whether
the price reactions are affected by the presence of multiple insider trades, we consider a three-day
window around an insider trade. We only choose insider trades that do not have other insider
trades of the same firm the day before, during the day, or the day after the trade. This reduced
subsample does not have any clustering complications.
The majority of the total of 117,179 isolated insider trades is sales, and approximately 40%
are insider purchases. A rough breakdown of the insider trade size distribution indicates a slight
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skewness toward smaller sized trades. About 22% of trades have a size of fewer than 1,000 shares
and 20% of the trades are block trades of more than 10,000 shares. The rest are between 1,000 and
10,000 shares. A majority of isolated insider purchases are small (33% of all isolated purchases)
as compared to block purchases (11% of all isolated purchases). Alternatively, 26% of isolated
sales are block sales and about 14% of sales have a trade size of fewer than 1,000 shares.
The evidence regarding price behavior around isolated insider purchases is very similar to those
in Table II. We see a significant decline in prices prior to the isolated insider purchases. Both
the mean and median abnormal returns are significantly negative, regardless of trade size. For
example, median abnormal returns from Trade −60 to Trade −1 are −49 basis points for small
trades, −46 basis points for medium trades, and −29 basis points for large trades. The initial
price impact from Trade −1 to Trade 0 is positive, statistically significant, and very similar to
the initial price impact reported in Table II. The median abnormal returns are 22 basis points
for small trades, 21 basis points for medium trades, and 26 basis points for block trades. The
subsequent price reaction is also positive and significant for each trade size group. The median
abnormal return from Trade 0 to Trade 60 is 30 basis points for small trades, making the total
price impact 52 (= 22 + 30) basis points. The total price impacts are 50 basis points and 46
basis points for medium and large trades, respectively. Initial, subsequent, and total price impacts
measured by mean abnormal returns are also positive and significant. Mean returns increase with
trade size group, indicating some evidence of higher returns related to the size of isolated insider
purchase.
Price behavior surrounding isolated insider sales indicates a statistically significant price in-
crease prior to insider sales. Mean abnormal returns are 11 basis points, 18 basis points, and 8
basis points from Trade −60 to Trade −1, respectively, for small, medium, and large trades. The
initial price impact is negative and significant. However, subsequent trades quickly and com-
pletely reverse the initial impact. The mean and median abnormal return values are very close
to the trade-to-trade returns of the original, larger sample. As before, there is no total impact of
the price decrease associated with isolated insider sales. In summary, the isolated insider trading
sample virtually produces identical results when compared to the original sample. Clustering
does not appear to explain our main results. The cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs)
of isolated trades in a one-day window are very similar to the ones presented in Figure 1 for
the entire sample (the full set of results are not reported here for brevity but are available upon
request).
3. Additional Sensitivity Tests
To determine if insiders abstain from exploiting earnings related information, we partitioned our
sample into two groups depending on the proximity of insider trading to earnings announcement
dates. Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon indicate that earnings announcement periods are clustered
around the periods of the last week of January to mid-March, mid-April to the last week of
May, the last week of July to the last week of August, and from mid-October to the last week
of November. Hence, we analyze stock price reaction to insiders’ trades separately for earnings
clustered periods as well as nonearnings clustered periods. Our evidence suggests that the market
reaction to insiders’ trades is slightly greater during the nonearnings clustered periods. This is
consistent with Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon that blackout periods do reduce the profitability of
insider trading somewhat. Nevertheless, the differences are never large. Our findings suggest
that taking into account blackout periods around earnings announcements does not affect our
results. Our findings also suggest that the intensity of market reaction to insider trading is also
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not affected by the arrival of public information regarding earnings announcements (Bamber,
Barron, and Stober, 1997, 1999; Fleming and Remolona, 1999).
Since surprise announcements may be reported late, they are likely to generate greater stock
price reactions. Therefore, we use the I/B/E/S (Institutional Brokers Estimates System) database
and obtain the earnings announcement dates for all the companies in our sample for the sample
period. We then focus on the insider trades that took place one day before, on the same day,
and one day after the earnings announcement. These trades constitute a small fraction of the
entire sample; 2.36% of insider purchases and 1.89% of sales surround earnings announcement
dates. The market reaction is not dramatically different from the previous results. The long-term
stock price reaction before and after the insider purchase around the earnings announcement is
slightly subdued, while the immediate reaction is slightly higher. These differences from previous
results are not statistically significant. For large insider sales, price reactions prior to the trade
and the immediate reaction to the trade are slightly higher, while the subsequent reaction is
somewhat lower. Overall, the results obtained from insider trades immediately around earnings
announcements do not affect our conclusions.
Finally we examine the time series stationarity of our results. For this purpose, we break up our
sample into three time periods: 1) 1988-1991, 2) 1992-1998, and 3) 1999-2002. As the number
of insider transactions increase over time, the fraction matched falls slightly due to our screening
procedures eliminating multiple trades and multiple matches. For example, the total number of
insider trades is 217,753 in the first four years (1988-1991) as compared to 645,836 in the last
four years (1999-2002) of the sample. In 1989, 7,473 of 53,202 insider trades are matched in
the companies where there was an insider trade. In other words, 14.05% of the insider trades
were matched in 1989. Alternatively, in 1999, 11,923 of 95,489 insider trades are matched in the
companies where there was an insider trade. To clarify, 12.49% of the insider trades were matched
in 1999 as opposed to 14.05% in 1989. This is a statistically significant lower percentage. Similar
differences are seen between the data from earlier years and from recent years as well. However,
stock price reactions to insider trading do not indicate any meaningful differences over time.
III. Conclusions
We find that insider trading contributes to the informational efficiency of the stock market. Upon
arrival, insiders’ purchases are associated with significant initial and subsequent price impacts
on a trade-by-trade basis. Prices rise, on average, by 100 basis points on insiders. Following
insiders’ purchases, prices continue to rise for the rest of the day by an additional 50 basis points.
Insiders’ sales also are associated with a significant initial price impact. Prices decline about
30 basis points upon the arrival of insiders’ sales. Following officers’ and top executives’ sales,
prices remain depressed throughout the day. For large shareholders’ sales, initial price decline
is reversed during the remainder of the day. When compared to noninsider trades, we find that
market reaction to insider trades is quicker and more complete.
We find no price impact immediately prior to insiders’ trades. There is no price increase prior
to insiders’ purchase orders, and there is no price decrease prior to insiders’ sale orders. This
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that market professionals do not front run insiders’
orders.
Insiders appear to be contrarian. Prices fall before insiders’ purchases and rise before insiders’
sales within the day. A potential explanation for this phenomenon is insiders’ order types. A
significant portion of insiders’ trades are limit orders and are only executed if the stock prices
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move to the limit prices. Consequently, insiders’ limit purchase orders are executed in a declining
market, while insiders’ limit sell orders are executed in a rising market.
Prices have been falling for at least 30 days prior to insiders’ purchases and rising for more
than 30 days prior to insiders’ sales. On average, insiders not only buy at the lowest price within
a day, but they also buy at the lowest price over a 61-day window. The timing of insiders’ sales is
similar, yet not as fortuitous as their purchases.
Some insiders make much greater profits from their limit orders by not paying for immediacy
of execution. Prices rise by 172 basis points following insiders’ limit purchases compared to 12
basis points for market purchases. This finding suggests that characterizing all market orders as
information-motivated trades and all limit orders as liquidity-motivated trades is not appropriate
for all informed traders. Some corporate insiders with monopolistic access to long-lived informa-
tion do not appear to be in any hurry to execute their trades. For this reason, limit orders appear
to be the better choice for them. One implication of our findings is that a heuristic association
between trade characteristics (such as urgency of trade, trade size, firm size) and the presence of
informed trading is likely to be weak.
We also find evidence consistent with the expectation that market professionals discover and
piggy-back on insiders’ transactions. After controlling for publicly observable trade character-
istics, initial stock price reaction is greater for top executives’ and officers’ trades than it is for
large shareholders’ trades even though the specifics of insider trading are not made public for
another 2-40 days. Upon arrival, insiders’ trades lead to significant increases in trading intensity
lasting for more than five minutes for insiders’ purchases. Insiders’ trades also reverse the order
imbalances that were present earlier in the day. Prior to insiders’ purchases, order imbalances
favored sales. Following insiders’ purchases, impatient traders send buy orders. There is a similar,
though weaker, effect for insiders’ sales as well. Since only market professionals are likely to
be aware of the arrival of insiders’ trades, this evidence is consistent with the expectation that
market professionals piggy-back on insider trading.
To ensure that our results are not caused by insiders themselves, we focus on isolated insider
trading activity. For this purpose, we examine all the results for a subsample of 117,179 trades
that do not have other insider trading around a three-day window of insiders’ trades. Our results
remain similar for isolated insider trades. Overall, our evidence indicates that the findings are
caused by the market’s reaction to insider trading, not by insiders themselves.
Finally, our evidence suggests that market professionals do not lose much to insiders as they
discover the presence of insiders immediately and act on this information. Market professionals
take advantage of their knowledge by first changing the price on insiders and second by piggy-
backing on insider trading. This evidence suggests that cost of insider trading is likely to fall on
uninformed liquidity traders instead of market professionals. 
Appendix: Matching Efficiency and Test for Potential Biases
We list the numbers and percentages of original reported trades that pass each of the seven
filters conditional on trade size in Table A1. The last column reports the results for the total
sample. The original insider trade data contains a total of 1,422,644 reported trades. We lose
approximately 7% of the original trades to Filter 1 (valid identification), 3% to Filter 2 (valid
market value) and Filter 3 (valid volume of trade), and 27% to Filter 4 (insider trade with unique
size, volume, and date for a given firm), or an exact total of 36.45% to the first four filters.
Overall, 63.55% of the original data pass the first four filters, which required at least one price
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Table A1. Summary Statistics on Matching Efficiencies
This table presents percentages and numbers of insider trades passing each of the seven filters by trade
size. The seven filters are defined as follows. Filter 1: the insider trade has a matching ticker symbol in the
ISSM/ Trade and Quote (TAQ) databases. Filter 2: the firm has a valid market value for the year of the
insider trade. Filter 3: the insider trade has a valid trade size. Filter 4: insider trades on the same date with
same size and price at the same firm are eliminated. Filter 5: the insider trade has a unique price volume
match in the ISSM/TAQ databases. The price of the insider trade is within a half cent of eighths so the trade
has a valid price to be matched with before June 1997. The insider trade is required to be within half a cent
of sixteenths after June 1997 until the specific start date of the Decimalization period for the firm. Exact
price matching is required with the Decimalization period. Filter 6: the insider trade passes filter 5, and
the uniquely matched trade in the ISSM/TAQ is executed on the listing exchange of the stock. Filter 7: the
insider trade passes filter 6, and the uniquely matched trade in the ISSM/TAQ is executed within the normal
9:30 a.m.-4 p.m. trading hours.
Trade Size within
[100, [500, [1,000, [10,000, ≥50,000 Total
500) 1,000) 10,000) 50,000)
Original sample 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
170,061 123,121 700,189 319,600 109,673 1,422,644
Passing Filter 1 93.63% 94.02% 93.98% 93.37% 89.86% 93.49%
159,221 115,757 658,048 298,414 98,552 1,329,992
Passing Filter 2 93.01% 93.33% 93.38% 92.64% 88.25% 92.77%
158,166 114,905 653,850 296,071 96,781 1,319,773
Passing Filter 3 88.10% 89.20% 91.31% 91.16% 86.84% 90.37%
149,826 109,824 639,367 291,343 95,238 1,285,598
Passing Filter 4 55.70% 63.58% 67.16% 63.78% 51.94% 63.55%
94,719 78,283 470,239 203,838 56,968 904,047
Passing Filter 5 14.34% 17.27% 16.64% 11.99% 6.05% 14.56%
24,390 21,257 116,537 38,314 6,634 207,132
Passing Filter 6 13.31% 16.24% 15.58% 10.88% 4.93% 13.49%
22,630 19,989 109,114 34,761 5,409 191,903
Passing Filter 7 12.35% 15.28% 14.60% 9.84% 3.89% 12.49%
(intraday sample) 20,995 18,811 102,212 31,457 4,270 177,745
volume match between each reported insider trade and those in the ISSM and TAQ databases and
36.45% of the original reported trades are not matched in the background trading.
The passing percentages also depend on trade size. Table A1 demonstrates that 56% of the
trades between 100 and 500 shares, 64% of the trades between 500 and 1,000 shares, 67% of
the trades between 1,000 and 10,000 shares, and 64% of the trades between 10,000 and 50,000
shares pass Filter 4, thereby containing a unique firm date and price volume trade for which a
background trade match may exist. Cornell and Sirri (1992) report matching 78 of 124 trades,
obtaining a success ratio of 63%, which is comparable to our matching success for nonblock
trades. Once we move to large block trades of more than 50,000 shares, our matching potential
falls to 52%.
When we apply Filter 5 (unique price and unique volume match), we lose another 49% of the
original reported trades. Hence, our biggest loss occurs not because we cannot identify the insider
trade at all, but because we identify multiple matches between the insider trade and background
trading placed by noninsiders. There just happens to be additional trades placed by noninsiders
with the same price and trade volume as the insider trade in the same firm on the same day.
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Since we do not know which of these matching trades is initiated by the insider, we eliminate
that particular trade. Filters 6 and 7 (listed exchange and regular trading hours) further eliminate
about 2% of the data. The final intraday sample contains 12.5% of the trades reported in the
original data or 20% of the original data for which background trades could be matched.15
It is important to understand why we are not able to identify many of the “reported” insider
transactions in the background trading at all (not passing Filters 1-4). First and foremost, after
1991, private sales and purchases are given the same codes (S and P) as open market sales and
purchases. Private transactions refer to trades done directly with other third parties or usually
with the firm itself. Since these trades never go through the exchanges, it is not possible to match
these trades in the transactions database. During 1990, private transactions constitute about 9%
of the combined sample. Moreover, private transactions involve a much higher volume of shares
than open market transactions. For trades involving 50,000 or greater shares, private transactions
rise to about 35% of the total sample. Consequently, more than 70% of the missing large trades
are likely due to the coding of private transactions.
A second reason we cannot match some large trades is that some insiders may simply break up
all large trades, whether due to information or liquidity, and report the daily aggregate as if that
was a single trade. SEC rules allow insiders to aggregate separate orders executed within the same
trading day for reporting purposes. Insiders are generally not allowed to aggregate trades executed
across different days; nevertheless, they occasionally report the sum of trades across multiple
days. Third, even if insiders submit a single order, brokers can break it up in order to match parts
of the order against available liquidity on the other side. If the order is especially large, brokers
are almost sure to break it up for execution. Additionally, insiders themselves may break up their
large information-related orders for strategic reasons in order to hide the information content of
their large trades. For reporting purposes, they simply report the totals for the day. In this case,
we also will have trouble matching large orders.
Our empirical tests can help distinguish between the above listed four different causes of
nonmatching transactions. Information content of private transactions is similar to that of open
market transactions. Consequently, under the first scenario, there should be no difference in
information content of matched and nonmatched transactions. If insiders break up some of their
large orders randomly or brokers break up some of the large orders arbitrarily in order to execute
them more efficiently, then nonmatching orders should have similar information content as the
matching orders. This is because under all three scenarios, the break-up decision is independent
of the information content of the trade. Within the matched sample, large trades should still
contain more information than small trades. However, if insiders break up only large information-
related trades for strategic reasons, then nonmatched orders should contain more information
than matched orders. Within the matched and nonmatched samples, there should be no positive
relationship between trade volume and information content.
We first test for the differences in the information content of matched and nonmatched samples.
To begin, we partition the original insider trade sample into two nonoverlapping subsamples:
Group 1 represents the matched insider trades that have passed all seven filters, and Group 2
represents the nonmatched insider trades that have failed any one of the seven filters. For each
group, we examine the price behavior from 30 days before to 30 days after the insider trading day
15We also examine the passing percentages by the identity of insiders, firm size, and sales versus purchases (not shown
here). We were more successful in matching top executives’ (19.7%) and officers’ trades (20.5%) than matching large
shareholders’ trades (16.1%). Note that the large shareholders’ trades are typically larger than other insiders’ trades (the
percentages correspond to the ratios of matched and identified insider trades to the insider trades after Filter 5). We were
about equally successful in matching purchases (20.3%) and sales (19.3%) and more successful in smaller firms (19.8%
in firm size Group 1 and 21.8% in firm size Group 2) than in large firms (16.5% in firm size Group 4).
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Figure A1. Abnormal Stock Price Behavior 30 Days before to 30 Days after
Insiders’ Trades for Matched and Nonmatched Trades
denoted as Day 0. We use the standard event study method and compute the abnormal returns as
the difference between the daily return to each firm minus the daily return to the equally weighted
market index. We then compute the CAARs by averaging and then summing the abnormal returns.
These returns are computed as follows:











where d = (−30, . . ., 0, . . ., 30), Pd,i refers to the closing price of the stock of the ith insider trade
on day d, Md refers to the level of equally weighted market index at the end of day d, and Nd is
the number of returns available for day d. For insider sales, we multiply the abnormal returns,
ARd,i, by −1. Finally, we normalize the CAARs by setting the CAAR on the insider trading day
to zero.
These CAARs from 30 days before to 30 days after the insider trading day are plotted in
Figure A1. They are very similar for both groups (matched and nonmatched trades). In general,
the CAARs have the same shape. They decline prior to the insider trading day and rise thereafter.
Figure A1 indicates that the price patterns around the two groups of insider trades are very close
and are almost indistinguishable.
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Formal statistical tests confirm that the differences in CAARs of the two groups never attain
statistical significance at any time horizon. For example, the CAAR from the insider trading day
to Day 30 is about 1.36% for matched insider trades and about 1.31% for nonmatched trades.
Both CAARs are highly statistically significant with p-values of 0.00. However, their difference
is insignificant from zero with a p-value of 0.76.
To further distinguish between the four different causes of nonmatching trades, we also test
the differences of the CAARs of the matched and nonmatched subsamples by three trade size
groups: 1) 100-999 shares, 2) 1,000-9,999 shares, and 3) 10,000 shares or greater. We find that
the information content of insiders’ trades increases with trade size in both groups. This finding
constitutes evidence against the strategic break-up hypothesis, which predicts a nonpositive re-
lationship between volume and information content for both groups. The fact that information
content also increases with volume for the matched sample further suggests that large matched
trades do come from insiders rather than uninformed outsiders due to subtle mismatches. Finally,
our evidence confirms that for a given trade size, the abnormal returns for matched and non-
matched trades are very similar. The differences in CAARs do not attain statistical significance
for any holding period.
Overall, our evidence indicates that the information content of matched insider trades does not
appear to be different from that of the nonmatched sample. This finding is consistent with the
first three scenarios and inconsistent with the strategic break-up hypothesis. Under the strategic
break-up hypothesis, we would have found the information content of the nonmatched trades to
be larger than that of the matched trades. We would have also expected a nonpositive correlation
between trade size and information content in both groups.16
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